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- Legal Perspectives on the Slaying of Laban
John W. Welch
Abstract: This article marshals ancient legal evidence to
show that Nephi's slaying of Laban should be understood as a
protected manslaughter rather than a criminal homicide. The
biblical law of murder demanded a higher level of premeditation and
hostility than Nephi exhibited or modem law requires. It is argued
that Exodus 21:13 protected more than accidental slayings or
unconscious acts, particularly where God was seen as having
delivered the victim into the slayer's hand. Various rationales for
Nephi's killing of Laban are explored, including ancient views on
surrendering one person for the benefit of a whole community.
Other factors within the Book of Mormon as well as in Moses'
killing of the Egyptian in Exodus 2 corroborate the conclusion that
Nephi did not commit the equivalent of a flrst-degree murder under
the laws of his day.

When Nephi reentered the city of Jerusalem late at night in
his final effort to obtain the plates of brass, he must have been
completely in the dark about how the plates could ever possibly
fall into his possession. The city was asleep; the chance of any
further meetings or negotiations with Laban was out of the
question; appeals to friends or intercession by Lehi's
sympathizers seemed improbable; Nephi himself was the son of
a prophet who was a fugitive from justice (at least in the minds
of those who thought he should be executed, just as the prophet
Urijah ben Shemaiah had been; cf. Jeremiah 26:23). Nephi
appears to have entered the city unarmed, having no expectation
of any specific way that he might gain access to the locked
treasury that held the plates. Nephi must have been as surprised
as anyone by the events that unfolded that night.
The story of Nephi's unexpected success in 1 Nephi 4 can
be viewed today from many perspectives, and obviously it was
included in Nephi's record for several significant reasons. For
example, this dramatic account demonstrated the religious
importance of the scriptures and the vital role of the law in
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God's desires for the Nephite people. If the law was important
enough that one man should perish so that an entire nation could
have it, the message was clear that the nation should be diligent
not to dwindle in unbelief-a lesson that was kept bright in the
Nephite memory for many years (1 Nephi 4:13; Omni 1:14;
Alma 37:3-10). Moreover, in Nephi's mind the events that night
validated the promises that the Lord had given to him personally
about keeping the commandments, prospering in the land, and
being a ruler and a teacher over his brothers (1 Nephi 2:20;
4:14, 17). Politically, the account undoubtedly came to play an
important part among the founding narratives of Nephite culture
and society, for it showed how God miraculously put a copy of
their fundamental laws into their hands (1 Nephi 5:8-10). The
fact that Nephi alone was able to obtain the plates-while his
inept and unfaithful brothers were unable to complete the task
their father had assigned them-legitimized Nephi's claim to
possess the plates and to lead the group. Indeed, for several
subsequent centuries the Lamanites accused the Nephites of
having robbed them of their rightful possession of these plates
(Mosiah 10:16), but the recorded facts about the events ;pf that
night went a long way toward showing that Nephi was the
rightful owner of the plates, was the legitimate successor to his
father Lehi, and was able to succeed with God's help where his
brothers not only had failed at the task but had said that it could
not be done.! Accordingly, for the next six hundred years, one
of the most important symbols of authority among the Nephites
was possession of the plates of brass (see Mosiah 1: 16; 28 :20;
3 Nephi 1:2).2 The story of Laban, therefore, serves several
purposes in the Nephite record: religious, political, historical,
and personal.
The story also has significant legal dimensions. By its very
nature the episode invites legal analysis and commentary: The
story involves the killing of a man, to which the legal
consequences of the day normally would have attached. The
terminology of the narrative is also legalistic: precise words and
technical concepts used by Nephi show that he wrote this story
1 See Noel B. Reynolds, "The Political Dimension in Nephi's
Small Plates," BYU Studies 27 (1987): 15-37; and "Book of Mormon,
Government and Legal History in the," Encyclopedia of Mormonism (New
York: Macmillan, 1992), 1:160--62.
2 Gordon Thomasson, "The Complex Symbolism and the
Symbolic Complex of Kingship in the Book of Mormon," F.A.R.M.S.
paper, 1982.
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with biblical laws in mind that justifiably cast this episode in a
favorable light. Accordingly, Nephi's slaying of Laban can be
evaluated profitably through the perspectives of the prevailing
legal principles of Nephi's day. Those precepts are found
primarily in Exodus 21:12-14, Deuteronomy 19:4-13, and
Numbers 35:9-34, discussed below.
The following analysis presents several factors that
substantially reduce Nephi's guilt or culpability under the law of
- Moses as it was probably understood in Nephi's day, around
600 B.C. Nephi may have broken the American law of Joseph
Smith's day, but it appears that he committed an excusable
homicide under the public law of his own day. This is not to say
that Nephi would have been acquitted and declared free to walk
the streets of Jerusalem again had he been brought before a
Jewish court in Jerusalem and tried for killing Laban, although
Nephi could have raised several arguments in his own behalf if
such a proceeding had ever taken place.3 As a practical matter,
however, Nephi's case probably never would have come before
a formal court because the required two witnesses were lacking,
making a capital conviction technically impossible (Numbers
35:30; Deuteronomy 19: 15). But if an action had been brought
against Nephi, early biblical law appears to have recognized two
types of killings-excusable and inexcusable-and the slaying
of Laban arguably falls quite specifically into the excusable
category.
The primary biblical text explaining the enforcement of the
general command, "Thou shalt not murder (ra$al))" (Exodus
20:13), is found in Exodus 21:12-14. It reads:
He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be
surely put to death. And if a man lie not in wait, but
God deliver him into his hand, then I will appoint thee
a place whither he shall flee. But if a man come
presumptuously upon his neighbor, to slay him with
guile; thou shalt take him from mine altar, that he may
die.

3 The research paper by two law students, Fred Essig and Dan
Fuller, "Nephi's Slaying of Laban: A Legal Perspective," F.A.R.M.S.
preliminary report, 1981, explores some of the hypothetical procedural and
substantive arguments that might have been advanced for or against Nephi at
just such a trial.
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The normal punishment under biblical law for murder at
the time of Nephi was apparently death (Genesis 9:6), although
the likelihood of paying ransom or compensation (kofer),
especially in cases involving unpremeditated acts or indirect
causation, has been vigorously examined by biblical scholars. 4
By way of comparison, the Hittite laws (c. 1400-1300 B.C.)
explicitly provided for slaves vr other persons to be given in
-cases of unpremeditated killings that occurred in a quarrel or
unintentionally ("[only] his hand doing wrong"), while they
excused entirely aggravated killings that occurred in the heat of
passion, thus increasing the possibility that Hebrew law
contained mitigating rubrics of its own. 5
Although the provisions of these ancient laws cannot be
stated precisely, Exodus 21:13-14 clearly shows that not all
killings were culpable under biblical law. If a killing qualified as
excusable under this provision, the law provided that the Lord
would appoint "a place whither he [the slayer] shall flee." This
did not mean that the killer automatically went free, only that he
was allowed to flee to a city of refuge and remain there for trial
(Numbers 35: 12). If it was then shown through witnesses that
the slayer had come presumptuously upon his victim to kill him
with guile or enmity, the slayer was taken from the city of refuge
and put to death by one of the victim's relatives acting as the socalled "avenger of blood" (Deuteronomy 19: 12).6 If it was
found that the slayer had not planned the event in advance, he
was still considered to be tainted by blood but he would be
granted safe refuge in a city of asylum until the death of the
reigning high priest, at which time he could safely return to his
former city. Nephi, of course, was prepared to flee-not only
from his city of residence, but from the land of Israel entirely;
thus, even to the extent that he might have been thought to have
4 Bernard S. Jackson, Essays in Jewish and Comparative Legal
History (Leiden: Brill, 1975),43-44, discussing also the views of Reuven
Yaron and Moshe Greenberg. Greenberg holds that "anyone who killed a
human being personally and with intent to harm could not avoid the death
penalty" by paying ransom. Moshe Greenberg, "More Reflections on
Biblical Criminal Law," Scripta Hierosolymitana 31 (1986): 16.
5 Hittite Laws 1-4, 37-38, 174, in James B. Pritchard, Ancient
Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1969), 189-90.
6 For a discussion of this concept in the context of the Book of
Mormon, see James L. Rasmussen, "Blood Vengeance in the Old Testament
and Book of Mormon," F.A.R.M.S. preliminary report, 1981.
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carried a blood taint due to his slaying of Laban, Nephi did not
pollute the land, for he did not remain in it. 7
The crucial question, however, is whether or not the law
of Exodus 21: 13-14 would have applied to the case of Nephi's
killing of Laban. In order to determine the answer, we must
cilfefully examine the two key elements that are mentioned there.
The first involves the slayer's state of mind. As will be
explained, the slayer must not have been lying in wait, or in
other words must not have come presumptuously (having
planned the deed out in advance) to kill his victim with guile.
The second involves the role of the divine will: God must deliver
the victim into the slayer's hand. Whether it was necessary to
satisfy both of these elements, or only one, in order to prove that
a killing was legally excusable under the law of Moses,S
Nephi's slaying of Laban probably satisfies both. After discussing these two elements, I will consider briefly biblical
precedents and traditional attitudes in Jewish law which, under
certain circumstances, allowed one person to be killed in order to
save the lives of a whole city or community. I will then end with
evidence from the Book of Mormon and also from Moses'
killing of the Egyptian in Exodus 2 to corroborate the conclusion
that Nephi's killing of Laban was not tantamount to murder
under the law of Moses.
7
For discussions of the ancient Israelite concerns about blood
guilt and its polluting taint, see Henry McKeating, "The Development of
the Law on Homicide in Ancient Israel," Vet us Testamentum 25 (1975):
57-65; Jacob Milgrom, "Sancta Contagion and Altar/City Asylum," in
J. A. Emerton, ed., Congress Volume, Vienna 1990 (Vetus Testamentum
Supplement) (Leiden: Brill, 1981): 278-310. "Shedding an innocent man's
blood, even unintentionally, involved bloodguilt, and no manslayer was
considered clear of this guilt"; Moshe Greenberg, "The Biblical Concept of
Asylum," Journal of Biblical Literature 78 (1959): 127. Regarding the
doctrine of pollution that emerged in Greece shortly after the time of Lehi,
see Robert J. Bonner and Gertrude Smith, The Administration of Justice
from Homer to Aristotle, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1930;
reprint New York: Greenwood, 1968), 1:53, 194-95, 203-5.
S It has been argued that the satisfaction of either one of these two
elements was sufficient for a killing to be considered unintentional, since
the waw in verse 13, usually translated as "but," makes better sense
grammatically and contextually when translated as "or," especially when
compared with a similar construction in verse 16 where the WllW can only
mean "or." Bernard S. Jackson, Speakers Lectures, Oxford University, 1985,
unpublishe~ manuscript, VIII.5-8.
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1. Nephi's state of mind. The basic facts regarding
Nephi's state of mind in this case are well known. He entered
Jerusalem late one night, probably unarmed, hoping to obtain
the plates of. brass. He did not know beforehand what he should
do. He stumbled onto Laban drunk in the street. He was
constrained repeatedly by the spirit of the Lord to kill Laban, and
eventually he cut off Laban's head with his own sword. In
killing Laban, Nephi sought no revenge, but acted reluctantly,
without hatred, and in good faith.
It is evident that the ancient concept of premeditation (if we
may use such a term) was different from the concept of
premeditation under modern American or British law. The
modern concept merely requires awareness and determination,
and such determination need not have been formulated any
earlier than the instant at which it is given effect. The archaic
concept of premeditation, however, required a murder to have
been preplanned, thought out, schemed, or implemented through
some kind of treachery, ambush, sabotage, or lying in wait.
"Lying in wait" is the term employed to describe the wily tactics
of a hunter stalking his prey (as in Genesis 10:9; 25:27-28;
27:3, 5, 7, 33); and the word "presumptuously" expresses
"insolent defiance of law."9 Thus, Bernard Jackson has concluded: "Premeditation [in biblical law] means that the action in
question was the result of a preconceived design, not of a desire
formed on the spur of the moment. Thus, not every intentional
act is premeditated."l0
Several strong clues indicate that Nephi had the ancient
definition in mind when he wrote the story of Laban. He trusted
implicitly that the Lord in some miraculous unknown way would
be "able ... to destroy Laban," even as he had vanquished the
Egyptians at the Red Sea (1 Nephi 4:3). He expressly
emphasized the fact that he did not know what he was to do as
he entered the city of Jerusalem: "I was led by the Spirit, not
knowing beforehand the things which I should do" (1 Nephi
9 See Mayer Sulzberger, "The Ancient Hebrew Law of Homicide,"
Jewish Quarterly Review 5 (1914-15): 127-61, 289-344, 559-614, esp.
290-91, citing Deuteronomy 17:12-13; 18:20,22; Isaiah 13:11.
10 Jackson, Essays, 91; see also 154-55. On the meaning of human
intentionality, and its theological connection in Jewish thought with
conforming to the divine will, see Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, The Human
Will in Judaism: The Mishnah's Philosophy of Intention (Atlanta: Scholars
Press, 1986); reviewed by Bernard S. Jackson, in Jewish Quarterly Review
81 (1990): ,179-88.
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4:6). This point is crucial, for it shows that Nephi had not
planned to find Laban and that he did not know that Laban
would be out with the city elders, where Laban would be, or that
he would be drunk. The occasion presented itself spontaneously. Nephi was completely surprised to find Laban. His
deed was not preplanned and, therefore, not culpable.
A later and more commonly found interpretation of Exodus
21: 13-14, however, would limit its application to accidental
killings irrespective of the slayer's state of mind. For example,
several biblical commentators, without examining or discussing
the point, readily assume that these verses only provide "that the
accidental homicide will have a place appointed for him for
flight"ll or that this grant of asylum was "limited to instances of
accidental homicide only."12 If such a limited understanding of
this text is correct, Nephi's slaying of Laban would not be
covered by the concepts of asylum in Exodus 21, for in no way
can this killing be described as an accident.
The limited interpretation of negligent or excusable
homicide in Exodus 21:13-14 and its related texts, however, is
unpersuasive. While it is true that Deuteronomy 19:4-5 gives as
an example of an excusable homicide the case where a man and
his neighbor are chopping wood and an axe head accidentally
flies off its handle and kills the neighbor, this does not mean that
the definition of excusable homicide includes only freak
accidents. If that were the intent, there would have been no need
for each of the three defmitive sections to require that the slayer
had not "hated" his neighbor in time past (Deuteronomy 19:4),
had not come "presumptuously upon his neighbor to slay him
with guile" (Exodus 21: 14), or had not injured him in "hatred"
or with "enmity" (Numbers 35:20, 22). Put another way, as
Jackson has concluded: "Unpremeditated but intentional
homicide seems to be dealt with in the same way as purely
accidental homicide";13 in other words, the concept of excusable
11 Greenberg, "Biblical Concept of Asylum," 125 (emphasis added).
12 Alexander Rofe, "The History of the Cities of Refuge in Biblical
Law," Scripta Hierosolymitana 31 (1986): 207 (emphasis added). See also
Anthony Phillips, "Another Look at Murder," Journal of Jewish Studies 28
(1977): 121. As far as I am aware, those who hold this opinion do not
discuss the matter in depth. Menachem Elon is ambiguous: "The death
penalty is prescribed only for willful murder [citations] as distinguished
from unpremeditated manslaughter or accidental killing." Principles of
Jewish Law (Jerusalem: Keter, 1975), 475.
13 Jackson, Speakers Lectures, VIII.8.
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homicide includes more than purely accidental killings. Ben Zion
Eliash concurs: although it is ''unclear what the exact relationship
is between the manslayer's [state of mind] toward the victim, or
his motive to kill, and the classification of that murder as either
intentional or unintentional," it is clear that "even a death brought
about by an intentional blow is not intentional homicide unless
that 'blow was accompanied by enmity."14 Accordingly, if
Nephi's intentions were neither maliciously nor hatefully
preconceived, he would well come within the defmition of a
protected slayer under the law of his day.
Evidently for this further reason, Nephi certified in some
detail that he had no desire to kill Laban and that he did not do
the deed of out malice because of any of Laban's offenses
against him and his family. Nephi reasoned with himself, "I also
knew that he had sought to take away mine own life; yea, and he
would not hearken unto the commandments of the Lord; and he
also had taken away our property" (1 Nephi 4: 11), but he
recognized that none of these rationalizations would justify the
slaying of Laban either at law or before the justice of God. He
resisted the distasteful assignment, saying in his heart, "Never at
any time have 1 shed the blood of a man" (1 Nephi 4: 10). He did
not act out of hatred or enmity, although the meaning of the later
term is somewhat unclear.l 5
14 Ben Zion Eliash, "Negligent Homicide in Jewish Criminal Law:
Old Wine in a New Bottle," National Jewish Law Review 3 (1988): 65-98;
quotation on 70-71. Regarding Eliash's equating of "enmity" with "the
intent to kill," see the discussion of Rosenbaum, below.
15 It bas been argued that the ancient concept of enmity ('ebah)
went well beyond personal hatred and was a technical term that requires "a
different kind of antipathy than that which arises in the daily course of
human events." Stanley N. Rosenbaum, "Israelite Homicide Law and the
Term 'Enmity' in Genesis 3:15," Journal of Law and Religion 2 (1984):
149. Rosenbaum suggests that this rare Hebrew term originally referred to a
state of belligerency that had been declared by a head of state against an
enemy of the people and that such a conflict can "only be resolved by the
death of one of them," ibid., 148-49. With respect to Genesis 3:15,
Rosenbaum suggests that God acted like such a king in declaring "enmity"
between Satan and the seed of Adam and Eve, for "the real fruit of [Satan's]
deception which took place in Eden was murder," ibid., 150, and this
conflict will not be resolved until either Satan or the king is dead. His
theory implies that only God or the king as the divine representative can
rightfully declare such a state of enmity, and he infers that the royal power
to declare 'ebah had been perverted by individuals in antiquity and thus "the
purpose of the legislation [in Numbers 35:21-22] was to prevent individuals
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In addition, Numbers 35: 11, 15, and Joshua 20:3, 9,
which seem to require that the killing occur "at unawares,"
should not be understood to limit the ability of a person in
Nephi's situation to flee to a city of refuge and seek exculpation
simply because he had been conscious of his action at the time it
took place. The Hebrew word translated "unawares" is
shegagah. Meaning "to sin ignorantly," this word also occurs in
Numbers 15:28 (compare Mosiah 3: 11). It derives from the
word shagag, meaning to stray, sin, miss the mark, be deceived,
or err, but not necessarily unconsciously. Depending on how
these words are construed, they may imply that the person acted
perhaps negligently but at least unaware of the consequences of
his action, or that he miscalculated or misjudged. Others in
Jerusalem might have judged Nephi to have acted in error,16 and
ancient legal distinctions may have existed between various
kinds of mistakes (i.e., ignorance of the law, mistakes of fact,
misjudgments of consequences, etc.), but no one could have
doubted that if Nephi sinned he did so unaware of it being a sin
and acted in good faith. Gauging by later Jewish law, which
may shed a little further light on the subject, "a murder by
someone under the mistaken belief that his actions were
permissible" was considered grossly negligent, but the slayer
was not subject to punishment;17 at least, it has been argued, he
"should be treated less severely than one who kills another in
ignorance of the more fundamental command not to kill."18

from declaring ~elJah against one another," ibid., 151. This observation, if
correct, would bear on the slaying of Laban, for it was indeed God-and not
Nephi-who declared such a state of enmity against Laban. When Laban
was killed by Nephi it was not under any kind of prohibited enmity that he
as an individual had arrogated to himself the power to declare.
16 For an interesting discussion of the ancient legal and literary
treatments of tragic errors as opposed to morally insignificant accidents, see
David Daube, "Error and Accident in the Bible," Revue internationale des
droits de l'antiquite 2 (1949): 189-213. Daube, 209, concludes that no law
developed distinguishing between error and accident because "it is
exceedingly difficult to mark off from any irrelevant error that sort and
degree of error which you want to consider as exonerating a man."
17 Eliash, "Negligent Homicide in Jewish Criminal Law," 88,
citing Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Nezikin 6: 10.
18 Arnold Enker, "Mistake of Law and Ignorance of Law in Jewish
Criminal Law," 2, summary of paper for the Conference of the Jewish Law
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Thus, Nephi's action would probably have come within the
additional protection of wrongs committed "unawares," if it
were viewed as a wrongdoing to any extent
The foregoing conclusion, based on an examination of the
Hebrew terminology, is confirmed on other grounds by the
Greek word ,that was used in the Septuagint to translate shegligah
in Numbers 15:28. The Greek word is akousios, a contracted
fonri of aekousios, literally meaning "unwillingly." Its root is
hekousios, from hekon, denoting action that is "voluntary,
willing, acting of free will," within one's control; and thus its
opposite, akousios, is action that is "against the will, constrained,"19 "intended but not desired."20 This term was used as
a legal term by Antipho, Plato, and Aristotle to refer to
"involuntary action," including such actions as "involuntary
murder" or jettisoning the cargo of a ship in order to save the
vessel and its passengers. Obviously, its meaning was broader
than the English word involuntary.21 Aristotle recognizes that
many difficult philosophical questions are raised by "actions
done through fear of a worse alternative, or for some noble
object," and he concludes that these "mixed" actions approximate voluntary conduct at the time they are committed; but his
main interest is not juristic and thus he does not pursue or
resolve the issue. Aristotle's discussion, however, shows that
the issue was a live one in the ancient world: where an action
was truly undesired by the human agent, it certainly could be
argued that it was equivalent to involuntary conduct for purposes
of assessing legal culpability so long as the circumstances were
meritorious.2 2
Such concepts coming from the Greek world only a few
centuries after the time of Nephi offer a valuable point of
comparison in assessing Nephi's state of mind. Nephi says,
"And I shrunk and would that I might not slay him" (1 Nephi

Association, Paris, July 1992, full paper forthcoming in the Jewish Law
Annual.

19 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English
Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968),27, 53, 514-15, 749-50.
20 W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon,
1968), 153.
21 Antipho, III, 2, 6; see generally, Aristotle, Ethics III, 1,8-9.
22 The entire third book of the Nicomachean Ethics wrestles with
the problems of classifying an action as voluntary (hekousia), involuntary
(akousia), or mixed (mikte). See Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 152-59.
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4: 10). This affinns that Nephi's action was strongly against his
will and his desire, and hence was involuntary under either the
Hebrew or Greek conceptions. Moreover he states that he was
"constrained by the Spirit that I should kill Laban" (1 Nephi
4:10). "Constrain" was a strong English word in Joseph Smith's
day, meaning "to compel or force; to urge with irresistible
power, or with a power sufficient to produce the effect" and "to
produce in opposition to nature."23 Being "constrained," Nephi
should not be viewed as acting willingly according to his
predilections, but obedient to a higher authority to achieve the
lesser of two evils. Thus Nephi concludes this section of his
account by saying, "And now when I, Nephi, had heard these
words, ... I did obey the voice of the Spirit" (1 Nephi 4: 14,
18). Accordingly, Numbers 15:28; 35:11, 15; and Joshua 20:3,
9 would have encompassed Nephi's action legally within the
concept of "involuntary" conduct and would not have taken him
outside the principles of asylum or of mitigated culpability.
Having found that the definition of excusable homicide
was broader than purely accidental killings and was not limited
by what modern readers would consider to be acts committed
"unawares," we must next ask whether that law in Exodus 21
was broad enough to include even a slaying with a sword.
Indeed, the application of Exodus 21 to the slaying of Laban
should not have been precluded in Nephi's mind by Numbers
35:16, even though that slaying was by the sword. Numbers
35: 16 states: "If he smite him with an instrument of iron, so that
he die, he is a murderer." This provision, however, must be
read in its surrounding context. The purpose of Numbers 35:1624, is, in essence, to establish the rule that the burden of proof
must be borne by or for the avenger of blood who pursues a
killer to a place of refuge,24 and that text sets forth several
evidentiary considerations that were to be weighed by the judges
in reaching their judgment. 25 If it could be proved that the killer

23 Webster's American Dictionary o/the English Language (New
York: Converse, 1828).
24 Numbers 35 also establishes the right but not the duty of the
slayer to seek refuge, althougb all aspects of the avenger's standing in the
ensuing legal proceeding are not specified. Eliash, "Negligent Homicide in
Jewish Criminal Law," 68.
25 This view is consistent with the conclusion others have reached
that Numbers 35 was written or used in connection with the judicial reforms
of Jehoshaphat, c. 900 B.C., to guide judges in handling cases of asylum.
"The passflge may be attributed to Jehoshaphat's reform"; see Rosenbaum,
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was not entitled to the protection of the sanctuary, the congregation was to judge between the slayer and the avenger of
blood (Numbers 35:24). Verses 16-18 seem to speak categorically, creating rules of strict liability that were to operate without
regard to the slayer's state of mind: They provide that if the killer
struck the victim with an instrument of iron, hit the victim by
throwing a stone, or struck the victim with a weapon of wood,
the killer was to be put to death. But while the use of such
dangerous instruments, weapons, or projectiles might raise a
strong presumption that the slaying was not accidental but
preplanned, verses 20-23 show that the earlier statements were
not intended to create an automatic judicial outcome based on
that single fact alone. The text continues, "But if he thrust him of
hatred, or hurl at him by lying of wait, that he die; or in enmity
strike him with his hand, that he die: he that smote him shall
surely be put to death" (Numbers 35:20-21). These qualifications show that "hatred" or "lying in wait" must still be proven
in addition to the probative-but not necessarily conclusiveevidence supplied by the nature of the weapon used.26 The text
concludes that if the killer "thrust him suddenly without enmity,
or have cast upon him anything without lying of wait, or with
any stone, wherewith a man may die, seeing him not, and cast it
upon him, that he die, and was not his enemy, neither sought his
harm," then the congregation shall exonerate the slayer and
allow him to remain in the city of refuge until the death of the
reigning high priest (Numbers 35:22-23). Thus, it is possible,
under some circumstances, for a person to be killed with an
instrument of iron and for that not to be counted automatically as

"Israelite Homicide Law," 151, citing Albright and Childs. Indeed,
Jehoshaphat appointed priests and elders to judge "between blood and blood"
in all the walled cities of Judah (2 Chronicles 19:5-11). However, the rules
in Numbers 35 direct the congregation in general and not a select body of
priests or judges in these evidentiary matters (see Numbers 35:24-25).
26 Elon, Principles of Jewish Law, 475, asserts, to the contrary,
that either element alone was sufficient: "willfulness or premeditation is
established by showing either that a deadly instrument was used (Num.
25:16-18) or that the assailant harbored hatred or enmity toward the victim
(Num. 35:20-21)." This reading, however, ignores Numbers 35:22-23,
which provides that a sudden thrust without enmity is excusable, even if it
is made with a deadly instrument.
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a homicide requiring the death penalty or other criminal
sanctions. 27
Obviously, the ground in antiquity between the two extremes of intentional homicide and negligent manslaughter was
wide enough to raise several legal questions that cannot be
answered today with certainty. Although we cannot reformulate
a precise law of negligent or excusable homicide with any degree
of certainty for the biblical period (and it is doubtful that a
codified version of the foregoing principles ever existed),28 it is
abundantly clear that several elements in Nephi's state of mind
were relevant factors in proving that a slaying was excusable and
protected by ancient Israelite law. Thus, although "the Bible
does not contain any abstract principles through which one could
determine exactly what criteria the court should use in determining whether a murder was intentional or unintentional,"29 it
is clear that culpable slayings under biblical law had to involve
some preplanned, treacherous, or hateful state of mind and that
such a requirement was lacking in Nephi's case.
2. God's deliverance of Laban into Nephi's hand. In the
end, Laban was killed for one and only one reason, namely
because the Spirit of the Lord commanded it and constrained
Nephi to slay him, for "the Lord hath delivered him into thy
hands" (1 Nephi 4:11, 12; see also 1 Nephi 3:29). Looking
beyond Nephi's personal state of mind on the matter, the
ultimate reason for his action was God's deliverance of Laban
into Nephi's hands. As the Spirit stated, it was the Lord who
caused Laban's death: "the Lord slayeth the wicked to bring
forth his righteous purposes" (1 Nephi 4: 13). And, parenthetically, the distinctive biblical punishment for inveterate, unrepentant apostates was execution by the sword (Deuteronomy
13:15).
The killing of Laban was not the only time in ancient Israel
when God sanctioned certain slayings to promote the national
existence and welfare of the righteous. During the conquest of
the Promised Land, Israel was commanded to kill the inhabitants
of the region in order to occupy that land and to establish Israel,
and accordingly Jewish law recognizes a special legal
classification of certain mandatory wars required when God
WELCH, SLAYING OF LABAN

27 For further reasoning along the same lines, see Eliash,
"Negligent Homicide in Jewish Criminal Law," 70-71.
28 Ibid., 69-71.
29 ,Ibid., 69.
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commands)O The wars of the kings were optional and limited,
but the requirements imposed by God in certain circumstances
were mandatory) 1
Some people have wondered why God needed to have
Nephi kill Laban instead of telling him simply to put on Laban's
clothes and go forth in disguise to get the plates. Leaving the
-drunken Laban alive, however, would probably have created
serious problems in several ways: (1) Laban could have
awakened, stumbled home, or could have been helped home by
someone else who found him drunk in the streets; if Laban had
reentered his house while Nephi was there pretending to be
Laban, Nephi would have been extremely vulnerable as a
housebreaker at night. (2) Even if Laban spent the night in the_
streets, the next morning he would have regained his senses and
would have been furious. He would have led a search party to
pursue and kill Nephi and his brothers and recover the plates of
brass. With Laban dead, however, his family and kinsmen
would have gone into mourning and would have immediately
attended to the funeral and burial. They were less motivated to
recover the plates than Laban would have been (especially since
they had already inherited Lehi's gold and silver from Laban).
(3) Few members of Laban's family were probably much aware
of the negotiations and conflicts between Laban and the four
sons of Lehi. With Zoram gone, people in Jerusalem could well
have assumed that Zoram was the one who had killed Laban,
since the city of Jerusalem had every reason to believe that the
four sons of Lehi had been scared out of town earlier and had
never returned. If Laban had not been killed, however, he would
have known Zoram and the circumstances well enough to have
suspected what had happened and to have led an effective
pursuit against Nephi and his brothers. These reasons explain
why it was virtually essential to the completion of Nephi's task
that Laban be killed, and with a little imagination several other
reasons can probably be suggested.
Be that as it may, Laban was not killed for any short-term
practical need of the moment. As Nephi stood marveling over
the drunken Laban, he must have been quite astonished. He was
30 For further details, see my "Law and War in the Book of
Mormon," in Stephen D. Ricks and William J. Hamblin, eds., Warfare in
the Book of Mormon (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and F.A.R.M.S.,
1990),49.
31 George Horowitz, The Spirit of Jewish Law (New York: Bloch,
1953), 147-48.

WELCH, SLAYING OF LABAN

133

drawn immediately to Laban's sword, which he removed from
its sheath. The splendor of the workmanship and the sharpness
of the steel blade left an indelible impression on the young man's
mind. As Nephi stood marveling at this weapon, the Spirit
constrained Nephi that he should kill Laban (1 Nephi 4:10).
Nephi balked. The Spirit then said to him again, "Behold the
Lord hath delivered him into thy hands" (1 Nephi 4:11). Three
times Nephi tried to rationalize the commanded deed, but the
Spirit said again, "Slay him, for the Lord hath delivered him into
thy hands" (1 Nephi 4:12).
The words of the Spirit were apparently a verbatim quote
from Exodus 21: 13, "And if a man lie not in wait, but God
deliver him into his hand." These words or their equivalent, in
my opinion, would have been recognized by Nephi as coming
from the Code of the Covenant. Growing up in Israel as a young
boy, Nephi would certainly have learned this passage from
Exodus 21. Deuteronomy 6:6-7 required righteous parents in
Israel to teach their children the law of Moses, to talk of these
words when they sat at the dinner table, to recite them as they
walked down the path, to repeat them before going to bed, and
to speak of them upon rising in the morning. One of the most
important texts of the law of Moses was Exodus 21-23,
essentially an elaboration of the familiar Ten Commandments.
Coming. early in the first chapter of the Covenant Code was the
text cited by the Spirit to Nephi.
The Hebrew verb in Exodus 21:13 translated as "deliver"
(Jinn§h) occurs only four times in the Hebrew Bible. Mayer
Sulzberger sees in this phrase a "subtle intimation that Divine
wisdom" causes events to occur "between persons not hostile to
each other, in order to attain ends of justice which the narrow
wisdom of human courts would be unable to reach."32
Accordingly, this rare Hebrew expression or its equivalent
indicated to Nephi in essence that God had caused Laban and
Nephi to meet that night,33 and that Laban's death was
32 Sulzberger, "The Ancient Hebrew Law of Homicide," 292.
33 The Hebrew may be translated, "God [ha-Elohim] caused him to
meet," Jackson, Essays, 91 n. 98; but this expression is otherwise
unattested and thus its meaning is not entirely certain. Eliash renders this
phrase, "and the Lord caused it to come [by] his hand," see "Negligent
Homicide in Jewish Criminal Law," 69. Paul Hoskisson has suggested in
private correspondence, 2 June 1981, that the Hebrew should be understood
to mean that "God has caused the opportunity to come upon him," namely
the one killed. The Greek Septuagint translators three centuries after Nephi
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occasioned by an act of God, but not as that term is understood
in its modern sense. 34 Especially if the Spirit used this rare word
and not one of the more common Hebrew words for "deliver"
(for example, najan, "to give over"; or hi$$fl, "to snatch, rescue"), the connection between the Spirit's words and Exodus 21
would have been far more obvious in Hebrew than it is even in
English.
The implication of the Spirit's instruction could not have
been lost on Nephi: he had not been lying in wait and the Lord
had delivered Laban into his hands. Therefore, in order to
accomplish the Lord's purposes, under this unusual and
extraordinary circumstance, the killing was on both counts
legally justifiable and religiously excusable. It was the kind of
killing that would be protected by the mercy of God in a place of
refuge within God's jurisdiction.
3. Better that one man perish than a whole nation. The
Spirit, finally, gave the following explanation for Laban's death:
"It is better that one man should perish than that a nation should
dwindle and perish in unbelief' (1 Nephi 4:13). This point of
view concerning the relative rights of the individual or the group
also has a long tradition in biblical and Jewish legal history.
The Old Testament lays a narrative groundwork for the
legal view that, under rare appropriate circumstances, a single
person can be exposed to certain death for the benefit of the
whole. David Daube has shown that in early Israel there was
little moral constraint protecting the individual in such a case:
Clearly, no such scruples are entertained by the
Judeans in Judges [15:9-13] who, fearing what their
mighty Philistine neighbours might do to settle

rendered these Hebrew words alia ho theos pared6ken eis tas cheiras autou,
literally "but God delivered [him] into his hands." Despite the possible
translational nuances here, the message should have been clear to Nephi in
any case: God had caused him to stumble onto Laban, or had caused this
outcome to come upon Laban, or had delivered Laban into his hands.
34 God's involvement for purposes of Exodus 21:13 should not be
confused anachronistically with the modern legal notion of "act of God,"
which has come to mean "an act occasioned exclusively by violence of
nature without the interference of any human agency." Black's Law
Dictionary, rev. 4th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West, 1968),43.
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accounts with the indomitable Samson, propose to
deliver him up in fetters.3 5
And the case of Sheba, a rebel against King David in 2 Samuel
20, provided a further instance where peace was offered to an
entire city in ,exchange for the life of a single man (2 Samuel
20:21-22).
This point of law, along with its biblical precedents and
ethics, was hotly debated between the Pharisees and Sadducees
at the time of Christ: The initial position of the Pharisees was
"unbendingly negative: no one to be surrendered ever, even
though extinction will ensue,"36 while the Sadducees (notably
Caiaphas in condemning Jesus) were more liberal (John 11:50;
18:14).3 7 Eventually the view of the Sadducees prevailed, as
evidenced in the Genesis Rabba: "It is better to kill that man
[Ullah] so that they may not punish the congregation on his
account."38 In the rabbinic period, Talmudic law went on to
puzzle deeply over the meaning and implications of these
notions. Used judiciously, these debates confirm- the fact that
surrendering one person to be killed for the benefit of the entire
group was a topic addressed in biblical law.
In the Talmud, unpremeditated homicide was eventually
subdivided into five categories: negligent, accidental, nearly
avoidable, under duress, or justifiable.3 9 For purposes of
comparison with Nephi's case, justifiable killings included (1)
those that prevented one man from killing another (and by
analogy, Nephi's slaying of Laban prevented him from causing
Lehi's people to perish spiritually) and (2) surrendering a
specific named individual to be killed when heathens threaten to
kill a whole group unless that one is delivered up.40 While the
rabbis passionately and compassionately debated the limited
circumstances under which the life of a specified individual
could be sacrificed for the benefit of the group,41 and whereas
35 David Daube, Appeasement or Resistance (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1987), 79.
36 Ibid.
37 See ibid., 86-88.
38 Genesis Rabba 94 on 46.26, cited in ibid., 87.
39 Elon, Principles of Jewish Law, 476.
40 Ibid., 476.
41 See TY Terumot 8:10, 46b, in The Talmud of the Land of Israel:
A Preliminary Translation and Explanation, Alan J. Avery-Peck, trans.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988),6:418, which reads:
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one case from the fourth century A.D. distinguished between an
individual and a group ordered to put a man to death (the
individual must first offer himself to be killed),42 there can be
little doubt that the possibility of killing one person for the
benefit of the whole was recognized under early Jewish law and
th_at it was consonant with the rationale expressly stated in
Laban's case ("better that one man should perish than a nation
should dwindle and perish in unbelief," I Nephi 4: 13).
Indeed, logic was on the side of the rabbis who held that
this rule applied especially when the victim had already
committed a crime worthy of death, and this raises the further
possibility that Laban was justifiably consigned to die because
he had committed such a crime. Falsely accusing a person of a
capital offense was a capital crime under biblical law
(Deuteronomy 19:19), as it had been in the ancient Near East
since at least the time of Hammurabi (Code of Hammurabi 1).
Since Laban had falsely accused Laman of being a "robber" (a
serious capital offense)43 and had sent his soldiers to execute the

It is taught [T. Ter. 7:20]: [As to] a group of men who
were walking along and gentiles met them and said, "Give us
one of your number that we may kill him, and if not, 10, we
will kill all of you"-let them kill all of them, but let them
not give over to them a single Israelite. But if they singled one
out, such as they singled out Sheba the son of Biehri [2 Sam.
20]-let them give him to them, that they not all be killed.
Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, "Now this applies [only] if the man
[already] is subject to execution, as was Sheba the son of
Biehri." But R. Yohanan says, "[It applies] even if he is not
subject to execution, as was Sheba the son of Bichri."
Similarly, it was permitted for a group of women to turn over one
who was unclean to be raped in order to protect the cleanness of the others.
Ibid. While it was allowed to sacrifice the welfare of one for the whole, the
rabbis taught that "the law for pious ones" advised against doing so. Ibid.,
419. Others held that the person singled out for death had to have "already
forfeited his life to God by committing a capital offense against God's laws
for which he had not yet been punished," although this opinion was not held
unanimously. Haim H. Cohn, Human Rights in Jewish Law (New York:
KTAV, 1984),38.
42 David Daube, Collaboration with Tyranny in Rabbinic Law
(London: Oxford, 1965),26-27.
43 Bernard S. Jackson, Theft in Early Jewish Law (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1972), 13; against robbers "the laws of war operated," 16. I
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sons of Lehi on this pretext (1 Nephi 3:13, 25), Laban
effectively stood as a false accuser. Such an accusation, coming
from a commanding officer of the city, was more than an idle
insult; it carried the force of a legal indictment. Since Nephi and
his brothers were powerless to rectify that wrong, God was left
to discharge justice against Laban.
Corroborating factors. Three pieces of circumstantial
_ evidence corroborate the view that the prevailing law in Nephi's
day counted the slaying of Laban as something less than
culpable or capital homicide. 44
First, it is significant that Nephi's brothers never accused
him of breaking the law. Laman and Lemuel had ample reason to
accuse Nephi. If he had broken the very law that he so
scrupulously claimed to observe, Laman and Lemuel would not
have let that pass unnoticed. They accuse him of usurping
power, of trying to become a ruler and a teacher over them, of
trying to trick them by his cunning arts and "foolish
imaginations" (1 Nephi 16:37-38; 17:20), but never do they
accuse him of murder. Moreover, their descendants taught their
children to hate and murder the Nephites because Nephi "had

thank Paul Hoskisson for recently reminding me of this point which we had
discussed several years ago. It is also probable that Laban was among those
who had wrongly accused Lehi of being a false prophet, which was also a
capital offense (Deuteronomy 13:5; 18:20).
44 In this paper, I have been concerned with the laws of the society
in which Nephi lived. God gave Nephi and all the ancient prophets and
apostles additional private rules that may have guided Nephi's actions or
.shaped his subsequent retelling of the events in 1 Nephi 4. See D&C
98:23-38. It is unknown, however, whether Nephi received the two laws in
D&C 98 before or after the Laban episode; he could have received them at
the time he and his followers separated themselves from Laman and his
group, for those two rules deal with (1) defensively enduring threefold
attacks by enemies on the righteous and their families and (2) offensively
warning one's enemies three times and offering peace before going to war
against them. These rules of war fit the events in 2 Nephi 5, but they do
not apply precisely to the case of Laban. The statement "if he has sought
thy life, and thy life is endangered by him, thine enemy is in thine hands
and thou art justified" (D&C 98:31) might appear to have overtones of the
Laban episode, but it literally applies only to a case of self-defense, which
was not the case with Nephi and Laban since Nephi's life was not threatened
at the time he found Laban drunk in the streets of Jerusalem. If Nephi had
known this law at the time and had considered it as complete justification,
he might well have said so. He sees more in the case than this alone.
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taken the ruling of the people out of their hands" and robbed
them (Mosiah 10:15-17), but never do they depict Nephi as a
murderer. This strongly implies that they accepted Nephi's
explanation of the case as a justifiable killing.
Second, at or shortly after Nephi's coronation as king,
Jacob addressed the young Nephite assembly. He pronounced
ten woes upon those who work wickedness (2 Nephi 9:27-38).
His ten woes are quite obviously patterned after the Ten
Commandments. 45 One of these woes pertains to murder: "Wo
unto the murderer who deliberately killeth, for he shall die" (2
Nephi 9:35). The conspicuous insertion of the word
"deliberately" is an uncharacteristic qualification. Few of Jacob's
strict woes are accompanied by such a modifier. The thrust of
his point is to be sure that only those who deliberately kill are
considered guilty and punishable. Under Exodus 21:12-14, that
would require deliberation, lying in wait, or other similar
planning and hatred. Categorically cursing all people who
killed-particularly at the coronation of Nephi-would have
been extremely undiplomatic. People immediately would have
wondered, "But what about Nephi?" The answer is simple. As
has been shown above, Nephi had not killed "deliberately."
Jacob's curse implies that he understood Exodus 21:13 to
require a high degree of advance deliberation.
Third, of course, Nephi was not the only prophet in
scripture to shed a man's blood. Moses killed an Egyptian when
Moses saw the Egyptian beating a Hebrew slave; when he
looked around and saw that no one was watching, Moses killed
the Egyptian and buried him in the sand (Exodus 2:11-12).
Fearing that he might get caught, Moses fled to the land of
Midian. This background sheds further light on the meaning of
intentionality in the law of homicide in Exodus 21. Moses, the
lawgiver himself, just like Nephi could have argued that his
spontaneous action was not preplanned or premeditated in that
sense. This, again, is not to say that Moses had not committed a
slaying, but only that it was a protectable slaying. He fled and
took refuge in the wilderness of Midian, perhaps thereby
creating the very precedent out of which the strange procedure of

45 "Jacob's Ten Commandments," in John W. Welch, ed.,
Reexploring the Book of Mormon (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and
F.A.R.M.S., 1992): 69-72.
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the cities of refuge emerged. 46 Only rarely, however, has any
connection between Moses' flight and the biblical asylum law
been suggested. One Jewish source imagined that Moses must
have been happy when he received that section of the law from
God, because "he that hath tasted of a food knoweth its flavor,"
and Moses "who had erstwhile been obligated to flee on account
-of having slain an Egyptian, knew the feelings of the man who
is pursued on account of a manslaughter that he had committed
unawares."47 Accordingly, the concrete cases of Moses and
Nephi offer us important practical glimpses into the meaning of
unintentional manslaughter in the biblical period.
Nephi's reference to Moses as he and his brothers moved
quietly toward Jerusalem that dark night turns out to be more
prophetic and more significant than Nephi probably realized at
the time. Nephi urged his brothers, "Let us be strong like unto
Moses.... Let us go up; the Lord is able to deliver us, even as
our fathers, and to destroy Laban, even as the Egyptians"
(1 Nephi 4:2-3). Although Nephi had the destruction of the
Egyptian army in mind (he assumed he would encounter
Laban's fifty), in the end it was not an army that Nephi
destroyed, but a single man. Nephi became strong like unto
Moses, following the archetype who set into motion the exodus
of Israel from Egypt. Even so, the slaying of Laban inexorably
sealed the destiny of Lehi's party as exiles from the land of
Jerusalem until they likewise arrived at their new Promised
Land. In retrospect, the parallel between the actions of Moses
46 Dating the biblical texts about the cities of refuge and
determining to what extent they were actually implemented is debatable. But
in any event, they predate Lehi and Nephi. Moshe Greenberg dates the
asylum laws before the reforms of Josiah c. 625 B.C.; see "The Biblical
Conception of Asylum," 126. Henry McKeating adduces evidence of a
custom of sanctuary in the early monarchy and shows that few are convinced
that these practices are not at least as old as the seventh century B.C. See
"Development of the Law on Homicide in Ancient Israel," 53-54. Whether
these laws were promulgated by Moses himself or patterned after him, his
flight to Midian could have influenced the development of the concept of
refuge.
47 Louis Ginzberg, The Legends o/the Jews, 7 vols. (Philadelphia:
Jewish Publication Society of America, 1938), 3:416 and n. 869. See also
Rofe, "The History of the Cities of Refuge," 237, suggesting that Moses'
flight to Midian, Absalom's escape to Geshur (2 Samuel 13:37; 14:13, 32),
and Cain's becoming a wanderer on earth (Genesis 4:12-16) offer clear
evidence that self-imposed exile from society was an alternative for the killer
under ancient Israelite customary law.

140

JOURNAL OF BOOK OF MORMON S11JDIES 111 (FALL 1992)

and Nephi was surely strengthened by the fact that both had
been involved in the excusable killing of a man.
Concluding observations. Over the years Hugh Nibley has
enjoyed telling a story about his Arab students in the early 1950s
who were required to take the basic Book of Mormon class at
Brigham Young University. Knowing that the Laban episode
had been troublesome to the moral sensitivities of many
twentieth-century readers, Nibley was puzzled when these
students found the story somewhat implausible but precisely for
the opposite reason he had expected. Instead of being troubled
that Nephi had killed the unconscious Laban, the students found
it odd that he had hesitated so long. 48 While the reaction of these
Arab students cannot be taken as evidence of the attitudes of the
inhabitants of the city of Jerusalem around 600 B.C., it does
reinforce the point that different cultures have unique values and
idiosyncratic legal expectations. Accordingly, modem readers
should be willing to consider not only the implications and moral
bearings of ancient scriptural events upon contemporary society,
but also to approach these developments in terms of the ancient
dispositions and legal norms that would have operated as
guiding principles in the lives of people years ago.
While nineteenth-century vocabulary and concepts are in
some ways useful in Book of Mormon exegesis, the Laban
episode is a case where the nineteenth-century environment
offers little help.49 Joseph Smith's nineteenth-century audience
48 John W. Welch, "Hugh Nibley and the Book of Mormon,"
Ensign 15 (April 1985): 52.
49 It is difficult to determine how the law of homicide was
understood in Joseph Smith's community. Under the earliest colonial laws
of New York, which were based largely on biblical precedents, a capital
homicide was defined as "wilful and premeditated." Earliest Printed Laws of
New York 1665-1693, John D. Cushing, ed. (New York: Michael Glazier,
1978), 124. Similarly, the Blue Laws of New Haven Colony (1656) spoke
of "willfull murder ... upon premeditated malice, hatred or cruelty, (not in
a way of necessary and just defence, nor by meere casualty against his will,)
he shall be put to death." Blue Laws of New Haven Colony 1656, compiled
by an antiquarian (Hartford: Case, Tiffany, 1838). In the nineteenth century,
even greater protection to life was given. Life "cannot legally be disposed of
or destroyed by any individual, neither by the person himself, nor by any
other of his fellow-creatures, merely upon their own authority."
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (Chicago: Callagan,
1872), 133. Laws, such as the Penal Code of the State of New York (1865),
minimized the extent of premeditated awareness that was required: §243: "A
design to effect death sufficient to constitute murder, may be formed
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was just as scandalized by Nephi's killing of Laban as is a
modem audience. Early Book of Monnon critics readily viewed
this episoqe as a clear indication that the Book of Monnon was
not inspired by God, a divine being who would never have
_commanded a true prophet to kill, having already commanded,
"Thou shalt not murder." That view, however, assumes only a
nineteenth-century viewpoint.
But when analyzed in tenns of ancient biblical law, the
case is framed within the appropriate set of legal tenns and
issues. This is not to say that the slaying of Laban presents us as
modem readers with an easy case: neither was it an easy case for
Nephi. In its ancient legal context, however, the slaying of
Laban makes sense, both legally and religiously, as an
unpremeditated, undesired, divinely excusable, and justifiable
killing-something very different from what people today
nonnally think of as criminal homicide.

instantly before committing the act by which it is carried into execution."
Homicide was excusable under these statutes only in certain accidents; in
lawfully correcting a child or servant; in doing a lawful act with ordinary
caution and without unlawful intent; when resisting an attempted murder; in
lawful defense; apprehending a felon, suppressing a riot, or lawfully
preserving the peace.

